Indigenisation of technology

Story hook

In May 2020, weeks into the COVID-19 lockdown, Prime Minister Modi declared a five-pillar Aatmanirbhar Bharat package and used the phrase "vocal for local" as a cultural cue. Three months later, the Ministry of Defence released its first Positive Indigenisation List — 101 weapon systems and components that the armed forces would no longer be allowed to import from 2020 to 2025. Among them: artillery guns, ship-based missiles, basic trainer aircraft, light combat helicopters, multi-barrel rocket launchers. The list grew through four iterations to cover 509 systems by 2023, and a fifth list of 346 sub-systems followed in 2024 from DPSUs themselves.

The scale was staggering. India's defence import bill in 2020 was $3.4 billion; by 2024, defence exports had crossed ₹21,000 crore, the first time exports moved into territory once reserved for imports. India built the Tejas Mark 1A, the Akash NG, the INS Vikrant (first indigenous aircraft carrier, commissioned 2022), the K-9 Vajra howitzer through Larsen & Toubro–Hanwha collaboration, and even shipped BrahMos to the Philippines — India's first major missile export contract (2022, $375 million).

This is the story of how a 75-year-old import dependency rotated through policy, money, and political will into the start of a manufacturing economy. The same template is now being applied to semiconductors, batteries, drones, and quantum systems.

Why this matters for UPSC

Indigenisation is the #1 Mains GS-3 topic of the 2020s — every year has at least one direct question on Aatmanirbhar, defence exports, PLI schemes, or technology missions. Prelims tests the specifics — list numbers, mission outlays, scheme acronyms. Interview boards probe "Is Aatmanirbhar protectionism in disguise?" and "Will technology missions become old-style import-substitution failures?"